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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
cLli,;TON <1 THOMPSON,

Plaintiff,

vs.
Tf[t; INDUNTRIAL COMMISSION
oF Ff,\ If, Wl'Arr E BOARD OF
11!~,\.LTfT AND rrHF~ STATE
1· (1R:\N('E FUND,
Defendants.

Case No.
10642

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Industrial Commission on April 25, 1966 denied
plnintiff \1 application for a Motion For Review and
sp0eifieally held that the Commission adopted the medi('nl panel reports filed in this matter (R213). The Statemr11t of :B'acts filed hy the plaintiff which alleges that the
Conunit:>sion made a finding that there was "no evidence
llrnl the seizure activity was directly related to the cir"11m:<h111eps :ornrrounding the applicant's employment" is
L1ke11 ont uf the context with the Commission's Order.
Tlu~ order of the Commission dated March 28, 1966 states
I kit '· Tl1p Commission adopts the second panel report and
1

finds that there is no evidence that the seizure a(·tiivi.
was directly related to the circumstanc0s SlllT1 11111 11),,
1·
the applicant's employment ... " (R210). ln plaintitf,
Motion for Review (R211), the plaintiff ohjectPd to 11 111
part of the Order wherein it was stated that there w: 1,
"no evidence". In the Commission's suhseqneut Orc] 1,1
dated April 25, 1966, the Commission stated that it 11.r,
basing its decision denying benefits to plaintiff 0 11 tli"
panel reports, which discussed and then disagree11 11 itl
the opinions of the plaintiff's treating physician.
Plaintiff sustained a head injury in the yeC1r 1'.1~11
when he was thrown from a horse, ·which sulisc'qur11th
required an operation at the L.D.S. Hospital in Sal1
Lake City. An operation was perform0d on the ri.~d1t sid 1
of plaintiff's head, which resulted in impairmt 11t of hi'
left hand (R31, 32). Plaintiff testified that he worked fnr
the Utah Department of Health as a janitor until a1iprrJX·
imately July, 1964, when it was necessary for him to 11011;
in a tunnel because of a break in a hot \Yater pipe. Tllf'
applicant stated that he worked on Thursday arn1 Fri1fa~
prior to the week in question in said tunnel (R29). If,,
testified further that he worked in the tmmel, witli tl11'
exception of one day, until Friday, July 17, 1!1G4.
1

The applicant did not make any complaints to h];
employer's supervisors concerning the work in the tunnel
(R63). On July 18, 1964, the applicant stayc'cl home a1111
rested and, on the following day, journeyed to }[anti,
Utah for a family reunion (R65). He assisted iu tll':
driving to the reunion (R66). The applicant admitted
on cross-examination that the seizure prohlems 1rr 11
2

ii 1111 ;itcd :d 11 :00 p.m., July Fl, 1964 at his home, and

period from the time he left work until the
.,.i 1111·1: r11·c11rrecl, he was having a good rest and relaxarioii ( J((i/). rl1 he defendants called the superintendent
:nul co-1,·orkers of the applicant, who disputed the plaintiff's ie.c;t imony as to whether or not he worked alone
tll 1l1r tumtel and disagreed also as to the length of time
lie 11urk<'cl in the tunnel.

11111111 :..; t11l'

to the hearing held on February 8, 1963
illlil l'nrnnant to :)::J-1-77 UCA (1953), the medical aspects
id this ('HR<' ·were referred to a medical panel. The medical
p:iI1el filed the initial report on l\Ia~v 28, 1965 (R146). In
ils r<'port, the medical panel assumed that the work was
strenuous and, further, that the patient had to work alone
in tJlC' rwrformance of his job. The medical panel genrrnll)- n 1-ie\vecl the medical history and the cranial in.Jlll'~' that oceurrecl twenty-five years previousl~v when
tli1' plaintiff was thrown from a horse. It appeared that
thP plaintiff snffcretl a subdural hematoma, and surgieal,
tl1cr<1py was earried out to remove a blood clot, which
rrsnlte<1 in a residual spasticity of the left upper exlrPrni1 y. Tlie medical panel considered the report of Dr.
flaniel Nusbaum, who had examined the patient, and
fortlH'r c011siderec1 the fact that in Dr. Nusbaum's opinion
the ('Oil di ti 011 ",-ery likely \vas precipitated by fatigue,
flnirl loss and Plcctrolyte imbalance associated with the
prrformance of heaYy labor in a confined space.'' The
medical panel also had knowledge of and discussed the
opinion of Dr. Krnneth .J. Nielson \\'herein he stated that
plaintiff's eondition had heen precipitated by strenuous
~nliseqne11t

1

nf'tjyjty.

3

crhe pa11el, in its last paragraph, deridrd nnd i'111!11,•
that the cause of the seizures and the resultinirI-> 1!('1111·
logical deficits were compatihlr with the pre-r\1,, 1 .,
1
trnuma and the same was previously 1wesent ,,j 11 <·r
time of the original injury twenty-five >'earn ago TL,.
resulting diffirnlties of the plaintiff were hroug·J1t 1111
additional pathology subsequent to that time, due to a~ 1
ing and cerebral arteriosclerosis. After making its fo; 1
ings that the ca.use of the plaintiff's difficulty \1·a, 11i,.
to the pre-existing condition, the panel then fom1ll tJi,11
there was no good evidence that the alleged ocrnne 11 "
on or about July 17, 1964 had any direct relafo111sliip 1.
producing the cerebral status noted or, further, that th
alleged injury aggravated a pre-existing eornliti11u "'
sulting in the present cerebral status.
j

•

'

j

·I·
1111

1

Subsequent to that time, the plaintiff objertP<l to th
medical panel report and the matter was set for lieari11~
on August 31, 1965. Upon direct examination at tlJi,
hearing by plaintiff's attorney, Dr. Hebertson, tliairma•
of the medical panel, stated that the panel felt that tl1··
patient had been engaged in strenuous \rnrk during tl1.
period in question (R164). The doctor testified fmtli1
that the panel took into account Dr. Nushaum's co11cl11
sions and opinion. The doctor admitted that prior to tli
filing of the first medical report, the panel was u111Jr.1
the impression that the plaintiff had a generalize<l seiim
lasting for a minute or two, followed by a hollow, <Jc.1·1
breathing and then the patient had, shortly after aniYi11~
at the hospital, a generalized seizure of the grand nm:
type. Mr. Thurber then asked the doctor that if tlw
seizures which the plaintiff experienced were morr ,;;PW' 1'
1

1

4

·~ ,,J ·' !n11~·<·r duration than that consid0red by the panel,

,,]t!>J!lt·r nr not this fact would hear on the findings of

p;1]J('l, a]l(l the <1octor ans\Ycred: ''Probably Yer>·

I iiL

1i1tk." (HHi!I).

Jh. Hclwrtso11, testif>·ing at the second hearing

011

rmittcr. reaffirmed the position of the medical panel
1,. 11111·t awl stated that the injnr~· complained of on or
:ii111111 Jul>- J 7, 1!!64 did not have any relationship in pro1rwi11g th<> C'<'rchral status of the plaintiff and, further,
1: ,i1 tlH' itllege<l injm»· clid not aggravate a pre-existing
,111Hlitio1l.
tliis

1

The attonw>· for the plaintiff then called Kenneth

J

a treating physician of the plaintiff. He testifird that the sri,,;1ue was more persistent than the medical
prrnel lrn<1 assumed in its report (R175). He further
tc~tified tl1at, i11 his opinion, unusual exertion would likely
pn•cipibtl~ this sriznre activity. The plaintiff's attorney
ili('ll call0<l Dr. Daniel Nusbaum and the doctor also disa;.trecr1 'vith the medical conclusions of the panel.
~;ielson,

Bct'anse of the information received b~· the treati11g
nhn;iria11:-; of the applicant, the file was returned to the
m1 1liC'al pand on September 21, 1965 in order that it
mitd1t reC'onsider the medical problems (R201). Subsequent to that time, a second medical panel report was
filrrl datPd December 3, 1965 (R202, 203). This report
:dnh•(l that tlw pa11el co11sidered the evidence introduced
•it the Trnln.strial Commission hearing. The panel then
l'f•\·ic•wpd in its report Dr. Nielson's and Dr. Nusbaum 's
irstimo11y. The me(lical panel then made a finding that
1

5

Mr. Thompson did have recunent focal all(] Mcre 11 ..\._, 1..(11·.]/,t'1
convulsion activity for twenty-four hours following !i:.
admission to the hospital. Notwithstanding this fart 1.1.
'
IC
panel found that the seizure was not related to the 'Tn
ployment but, rather, was due to the traumatic> e11repli~lu
pathy that was probably present since the time of in.inn '
twenty-five years ago and was brought about hy arJrJ,
tional pathology due to age or cerebral encephalopa11 11
Plaintiff objected to this medical report (R206). H01:.
ever, when the Industrial Commission set the mattrr ,
down for hearing on March 30, 1966, it was canc(,lll'cl L'.
the attorney for the plaintiff.
The Industrial Commission, therefore, ha<l two var)
ing medical opinions. The members of the mediral p8nrl
found that the seizures were not precipitated hy the 1·111 '
ployment but were, rather, due to a pre-existing cornlitioH
that was not aggravated by the incidences that occurrrr!
on July 17, 1964. The treating physicia11s of the plai11tifl
disagreed and felt that the stre11uous activity of th~
plaintiff precipitated the seizures. The Industrial Com
mission chose to believe the medical panel, as set f11rtl1
in its Order dated April 25, 1966.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN
DENYING BENEFITS TO THE APPLICANT UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.
The plaintiff in his brief insists that the Commis~iui!
held that there was no evidence that the seizure Hrfoit1
was related to the employment. As discussed 1n·cyion,h
6

tlw ~tat0nH·11t of Facts, this statement was taken out
,:f ,·untex! a11d was not the final Order. The plaintiff,
Jini\'(•\er, did state the proper issue in his brief under
P:iinl I wherein he alleged that the question in this case
,
]!ether the Commission acted unreasonably in cDn1 11
i llliling
that the seizure activity rendering plaintiff
, 0 tnlly nml permanently disabled was not related to his
,•rn] iloym0n t.
,

lo.1

rrhe plaintiff cites m his brief Jones vs. Cali(iJrnia flacking Corp., 121 U. 62, 224 Pac. 2cl 640
I 19:51 ). The defendant agrees with the outline of facts
of the Jones case cited by the plaintiff; howenr, disa0'1ws
r) , - - that the case was decided on the basis that the
plaintiff el aims. The clef endant also agrees with the gen1·rnl rulc8 set forth in the Jo11es case, supra; however,
11lwt is at issue here is not the well defined law that an
internal failure which results from over-exertion in the
rnurse of an applicant's employment is a compensable
inJnry, even if the internal failure based upon exertion
aggnm1tes a pre-existing condition. The medical panel
in both of its reports found and assumed that the plaintiff in the week prior to his seizure was doing work that
1rns s1n'nuous. Secondly, the panel assumed that the
applirnnt had to work on the tunnel alone, which would
i11cTPnsc the work loacl. In the second panel report, it
also assumed that the temperature in the tunnel at the
time of tlw allegecl incident was high and, notwithstandi11g tlirsc Lids, held and found that the cause of the
>ti·mres was not related to the employment but, rather,
1ras hrnuglit about by a pre-existing condition which "·as
11 ot precipitated nor aggravated l)y the working cornli-

7

tions of the applieant. The pm1el n•pol't, n•ad i11 it,
tirety, shows that the pmwl hasiC'all~, made hrn fin 1i 111 .
(1) that there was no causal eo1m<-•ctio11 hetwpp 11 11
seizures and the applicant's employment; and (2) tli:,
the seizure activity and resulting difficulties of tJi 1• " 1
plicant were due to a pre-existing co11ditio11 rrlatl,1\ 111
past injury. Admittedly, Dr. Nusbaum 's a11Cl Dr. ;.;ir·hir
opinions were different than that of the mecliral Jlill·
In light of these facts, the J 011cs case strongly ~u,ta:
defendants' position here. The Supreme Court did 11 ,
hold, as implied in plaintiff's brief, that the ll1Pl'i' Lr
of unmmal exertion and then a resulting coronnn 'Ir·.:
sion entitled the applicant to benefits umler thl' \\'11
men's Compensation Ad. Rather, tlw Supreme ('1111:
examined critically and ca rdully the me(1ical tPRtim1111
off ere cl by the parties.
1

,

1

In that case, two physicians testifie(l on lwlinlf r1f :1.
applicant. They testified positi,'ely that it wa~ tl1,i
opinion that the occlusion and th<.' cl<.' a th whieh re~u11.1
therefrom wer<.' due to e)(ertiou and fatiqlw caused h> 11
work under the circumstances (kscribecl prior tn i\
applicant's death. The Commission ruled against \I
applicant and the Supreme Con rt, after poi11tillg out ti::
ther<.' was positive evidence to sustain plaintiff's po,!t'1 1

11

then posed the follo,ving question: ''Is there m1y >::
stantial evidence upon which a contrary finding 1·11 11
reasonably he made?" The Court then exnminrrl t
testimony of the doctor that allege(lly sustained \]It''
feudants' position. When the hypotlwtica1 qnN~tio11 '1
put to that doctor on whether or not the eanse of lle:r
was related to the employment, the doctor a11s,wri

1

8

that it possibly is related in this
p:irticnla r case but I don't think you can dogmatically
c•\.\ it IS a ca use." The Court, therefore, pointed out that
die doctor did 11ot testify contrary to the plaintiff's
rliwlors Jmt, rather, sustained plaintiff's position and
iliat (]w rc('ord was void of any substantial evidence which
r«nmternckd the testimony which showed that the activity
rd the· appliC'allt induced his death.
. li.i

""'1

n

op1111011 rn

111 tliis particular case, we have no hesitation on the
11 ,111 of th<• opinion of the medical panel. The medical
pa11el wns u11equivocal in its position. 'l'hus, the Commis·'HJll had th0 dnty to determine which position or opinion
rn adopt. The Commission adopted the opinions of the
nJl'dieal pm1el report and incorporated those opinions in
it~. Order.

Tlic la\\· is clear and it is fundamental that the Commi~~iou ':'l decision cannot be overturned as arbitrary and
C<1pricions if it bases its order on competent evidence.
Jt is f 1rndame11tal that the findings of the Commission on
l'nnfliding mr11ical testimony cannot be disturbed on
apprnl. S('e CmnJJbdl vs. Eagle and Blue Bell Mining Co.,
iiI TT. 430, 2:11 Pac. 620, wherein the Court stated as
tnl!mrs:
"The testimony taken before the Commission
consists entirely of the opinions of medical experts with the exception of the testimony of the
applicant, Campbell. This testimony is conflicting.
\Ve can see nothing in this record for review
PXC<~pt the findings of the Commission based upon
<·1rnflidi11g testimony. Tlw testimony was compd0nt arnl material to the issues to be determined
hy the Commission, and on that testimony the
Commission made its findings. This Court, in pro9

ccedi11g.s of this characte1·, is without pow,.
1 1
disturb the findi11gs of the Commis:;j 011 11: "
upon competent conflicting testimony, '!'It(' o\·i\ ·
Ii 1'
so proncles; and the Court has so <1Peid<>d ii
numerous opinions. It is wholly immatc·rial ti:,
this Court, or the indiYidual memlwrs UierP~:;'
might han' come to a-., c1iffe.rei.1t co11dusio 11 11 1,111
that reached by the Comm1ss1011. ThP Comrni,
sion 's firnlings a re binding wh(•11 snpport1>il \,,
competent, material testimony.''
d\(Jr!

•

•

1
•

'

In plaintiff's brief, statements that there WRs IJ!·
indication that the medical panel did not examine or ]i, 11 ,
available the evidence advanced during thu heari11g r,1
February 8, 1965 are not sustainecl by the rreonl. The fil·
of the Commission, which is a part of this reeorrl, 11::·
forwarded to the medical panel on I\Iarch 27, 19()3 (HW1
The panel report clearly slmws that the dortorn \11·r,
conscious of the working conditions of thr appfon'.
Much to do is made of the fact that the Commi,,irr:1
failed to conclude \\'hether or not there was nm1s11u:
exertion. One is remiss to answer this argument lwenu"
the medical panel in its report assumed unnsnnl
strenuous activity and based its opinion on these a~snmp
tions. Therefore, the straw man crea t0d in plaintiff:
brief is without merit for the reaso11 that tlw fact 111
unusual exertion was assumNl and, notwithsta11di11C( tin:
fact, the medical panel concluded that onr-C'xertiou tli i
not precipitate the seizure and the resulting difficnlt 1
of the plaintiff.
1

The plaintiff spends much time in his lll'ief and ci\
authority contending that unusual exertion whi<'h P11
cipitates a disabilit~' or death is compensable. The t],

1
"

10

,,J, 1nt:-: d() J1ot di8agree with this rule. 'l'he plaintiff

1

1

,wh co11:-:i(krahlc time in his brief in citing authority
tli;it ;1Jl aggravation of a pre-existing condition is compt n~ahl<· under our compensation act. The defendants
,;tipnl<ttc that thi:-: is the law. There is no need to argue
tlte:;c "lcmc11tary and fundamental decisions that have
111 .1•11 laid down by this Court. 'l'he issue presented in this
1., 1.,r 1:5 \\'hetlicr or not the Commission acted arbitrary
, 111 i1 c·<q11ieious in believing the medical panel report
11 .r:-ni:-; t11r treating physicians of the plaintiff. The plain1iff iu his hrief states that the medical panel did not take
i11 to t·o11c-;icforatio11 certain facts. It is clear from the
record that the medical panel at its initial meeting did
not 11an tlH· benefit of the opinions of the treating
ph~1-sicia11s arn1 their findings in regards to the length of
,eizun•. rl'JieSP matters were brought out in cross-exami:1ntiu11 of tlir l'hairman of the panel, and he stated that
the rnri:rnce in this fact would not alter his opinion. Not1rith~tandi11g the cloctors' response, the Industrial Commi,si011 refenecl the matter back to the medical panel so
tl1nt it ronld consider the additional information given
h:· t l1L' tre>a ting physicians. The medical panel then consit1l·1wl these facts, inelucling unusual temperature, unusual exertion, unusual sweating and salt loss and
assnmecl l he facts that the plaintiff is now contending
nrc in clispnte. As far as the medical panel was concerned,
tl1l'~t· foets were not in dispute, and based upon these
forts, t]](' mrdiea1 panel found that there was no con111•ctio11 l1ei\H'<'n the seizure and the working conditions
<lllcl affi rnrn ti vt• lv founcl that the seizures were triggered
_

11

11

hy a pre-existing condition and tlw aJ.va11ei11g- ao·p
ri'' ,
~
) [,,.
applicant.
The Commission's Order adopted the orm 11011 , 'J
the medical panel. The law appears clear that it' tk
Industrial Commission, in its purported fintli 11 g, 11
Order, refers to a narration of testimony, it mw;1
assumed that the Commission intended to find tJir, f: 1,.
in accordance with said testimony. Therefow', the· \'orn
mission in holding that it was standing 011 tl1e 11 :
report found the facts in conformity therewith. ~'
S.L.C. vs. Industrial Comrnissio11, 137 Pac. 2d 3G4. lt nm
be agreed that an Order that does uot set out fincli11gx 11
fact and conclusions of law separately may lead to so111,
confusion. To say that the Commission holds that th1>:1
was no evidence is contrary to the medical panel rc·1ior
and contrary to the Commission's Order which t!
plaintiff is appealing. The Commission found the far.
in conformity with the medical panel report, allll tl1
Court has held in Looser vs. Industrial Commissi()11 "'
Utah, 9 U. 2d 81, 337 Pac. 2d 965, that:
: ,
1 1

1

"It is obvious from the record that althollgl1 l:
Commission did not denominate its recitation,,
facts as 'findings of fact', the facts "·ere J'l'('it,,
in its Order as extensivelv as thev wonl(l hcr
been set forth under a sepa.rate caption. Thl' fiii
ings of fact, however denominate<l and althon;:
not as articulate in nature ancl form as we m1~ 1
choose to have them, are not doomed for th 11 •
reasons onlv if substantial compliance with ti
.'
letter and spirit of the statute has been effr'1';
ated, as we think they have here, where but fo'
an appellation the findings in the Order wo 11
have sufficed.''
1
11

1

12

CONCLUSION
The issue presented here is not whether or not there
.. as unnsu:=il exertion or strain but, rather, assuming
1
thr~e fads, whether or not the Commission acted arbitnuy and capricious in adopting competent and material
rnetlical testimony.

Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT D. MOORE
421 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defenda;n.ts
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